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ABSTRACT 
Each year, 10% of all federal government spending is lost due to 
fraud, which adds up to over $350 billion a year. Unfortunately, many 
well-meaning federal judges are inadvertently making it easier for 
wrongdoers to retain these ill-gotten gains by unnecessarily cutting short 
the investigative time for the government to evaluate fraud allegations 
brought by whistleblowers under the False Claims Act (FCA). The FCA 
is the federal government’s primary tool to recover funds obtained 
through the submission of false claims. Because the government is una-
ble to detect most fraud cases absent the help of whistleblowers, Con-
gress included qui tam provisions in the FCA to authorize private indi-
viduals to receive a portion of the amount recovered as a reward. To ob-
tain a reward, however, the whistleblower—known as a “relator”—must 
file a qui tam complaint against the wrongdoer. The qui tam complaint is 
filed under seal and served only upon the government. The FCA provides 
the government an initial sixty-day period to evaluate the qui tam com-
plaint and determine whether it elects to intervene. The FCA also permits 
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extensions to this period upon a showing of “good cause.” When the 
government takes over qui tam cases, it obtains a recovery 95% of the 
time. On the other hand, when the government declines, the relator re-
covers in only 5% of cases. Therefore, it is imperative that the courts 
provide the government with a full opportunity to make an election de-
termination. However, the courts are not applying a proper standard for 
granting more time to intervene in qui tam cases, which creates two sig-
nificant harms. First, cutting off the government from completing its in-
vestigation by applying a rigid and improper definition of the FCA’s 
“good cause” standard allows fraudfeasors to keep billions of dollars in 
taxpayers’ funds without a resolution on the merits. Second, because of a 
circuit split, the definition of good cause for the continuation of the seal 
under the government’s primary fraud statute depends solely upon where 
the case is filed. 
The following hypothetical underscores the problem and the need 
for a uniform standard. Assume a whistleblower sends the government a 
letter or calls a hotline to report that a hospital is committing Medicare 
fraud. Under the tiered FCA statute of limitations, the government has a 
minimum of six years and maximum of ten years to file an FCA com-
plaint, depending on when the fraud is discovered. The FCA authorizes 
the government to issue subpoenas for documents and take deposition 
testimony during the investigative period. No court permission is needed 
to take such informal discovery. In fact, the only limitation is the FCA’s 
six- or ten-year statute of limitations.  
Suppose instead the same whistleblower with the same facts desired 
to obtain a reward for reporting fraud. Thus, instead of calling a hotline, 
she filed a qui tam complaint in federal court (which is a prerequisite to 
obtaining a reward). In that situation, the court keeps the qui tam case 
under seal for the initial sixty days, and longer upon request and a show-
ing of good cause. Under this scenario, the FCA still permits the gov-
ernment to conduct informal discovery, including issuing subpoenas for 
documents or deposition testimony in order to make a decision to inter-
vene in the qui tam complaint.  
The problem is that if no reward is sought, the government has six 
to ten years to investigate the allegations, but if a reward is sought, some 
courts limit the government to six months or even as little as sixty days. 
In fact, the amount of time the government is granted to conduct an in-
vestigation in a qui tam case is dependent upon the judge’s view of 
“good cause.” As a result, the amount of time ranges from sixty days to 
nine years, depending on which part of the country the federal case is 
filed or even upon which judge is drawn. 
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In reality, it often takes between three and six years for the govern-
ment to properly investigate and bring a complex fraud case that satisfies 
Rule 9(b) and fulfills the duty to conduct a parallel criminal investigation 
without prematurely or wrongfully accusing a company of defrauding the 
government. Certainly the right of the government to conduct an in-depth 
fraud investigation and fully utilize the investigative tools provided un-
der the FCA should not depend upon whether a whistleblower is seeking 
a reward or on a particular court’s view of good cause. Moreover, the 
lack of a uniform standard has resulted in a wide disparity of legal opin-
ions that makes the result of whether the government can spend the nec-
essary time to determine if fraud occurred almost totally dependent upon 
where the federal FCA case is filed. 
This Article proposes a uniform standard for interpreting the FCA’s 
“good cause” requirement that comports with the goals, purposes, and 
statutory language. Specifically, it argues that requests by the govern-
ment for extensions of the seal period should be liberally granted for up 
to three years provided that the government’s investigation is still active 
and ongoing, and up to six years provided that the government can show 
a need for more time due to the size or complexity of the case or other 
circumstances requiring more time than an ordinary fraud investigation. 
To go beyond six years, however, this Article proposes that the govern-
ment must obtain a partial lifting of the seal to notify the defendant of the 
allegations and obtain its consent.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Each year, nearly 10% of all federal government spending is lost 
due to fraud,1 which adds up to over $350 billion a year.2 Because the 
government is unable to detect most instances of fraud absent the help of 
whistleblowers, Congress included qui tam3 provisions in the False 
Claims Act (FCA)4 to authorize private individuals called relators5—also 
referred to as qui tam plaintiffs or whistleblowers—to receive a reward 
consisting of a portion of the amount recovered. In order to be eligible 
for a reward, a whistleblower must file a civil qui tam suit on behalf of 
the government against a fraudfeasor for submitting false claims to the 
government for payment.6 Overnight, the qui tam provisions of the FCA 
became the government’s best weapon for combating fraud against the 
government.7 Unfortunately, Congress amended the FCA numerous 
times in an attempt to provide rewards when help was needed, but pre-
vent qui tam plaintiffs from obtaining recovery without meaningful con-
tribution to the suit.8 One of the biggest mistakes occurred in 1943 when 
Congress limited the filing of qui tam suits if they were “based upon in-
formation in the possession of the government.”9 Because this restricted 
the availability of recoveries, the number of qui tam suits dried up im-
mediately and fraud against the government flourished.10 In fact, from 
1943 until 1986, there were only six qui tam suits brought per year.11 
After realizing it had “killed the goose that laid the golden egg,”12 
Congress amended the qui tam provisions in 1986 to remove the re-
                                                            
 1. Joel D. Hesch, The False Claims Act Creates a “Zone of Protection” That Bars Suits 
Against Employees Who Report Fraud Against the Government, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 361, 368–69 
(2014) [hereinafter Hesch, Zone of Protection]; Joel D. Hesch, Breaking the Siege: Restoring Equity 
and Statutory Intent to the Process of Determining Qui Tam Relator Awards Under the False Claims 
Act, 29 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 217, 224 (2012) [hereinafter Hesch, Breaking the Siege]. 
 2. Hesch, Breaking the Siege, supra note 1, at 225 nn.37–39.  
 3. “Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac 
parte sequitur, which means ‘who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his 
own.’” Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000). 
 4. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012). 
 5. A “relator” is one who relates the fraud action on behalf of the government. United States ex 
rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 225 n.7 (1st Cir. 2004) (“A ‘relator’ is ‘[a] 
party in interest who is permitted to institute a proceeding in the name of the People or the Attorney 
General when the right to sue resides solely in that official.’” (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1289 (6th ed. 1990)). 
 6. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–( G) (2012). 
 7. Hesch, Breaking the Siege, supra note 1, at 232. 
 8. Id. at 230–32 (outlining the various times Congress amended the FCA). 
 9. Id. at 231. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 232. 
 12. Id. at 231. 
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striction. This opened the floodgates13 and the qui tam provisions once 
again became the federal government’s primary tool to recover ill-gotten 
gains.14 For instance, between 2010 and 2014, the government recouped 
$20 billion in taxpayers’ dollars using the FCA.15 During that time peri-
od, 70% of all of the government’s FCA recoveries were qui tam cases.16 
The combination of enlisting federal whistleblowers and allowing the 
government sufficient time to complete its investigation has worked re-
markably well and needs to be protected. Today however, it is not Con-
gress that is tinkering with the FCA. Instead, some courts are reducing 
the effectiveness of the qui tam provisions by inappropriately restricting 
the amount of time the government is allowed to investigate the qui tam 
allegations. 
Congress established a particular protocol for private individuals 
seeking a whistleblower reward for reporting fraud against the govern-
ment. Specifically, a whistleblower may not receive a reward for calling 
a hotline or informally reporting fraud against the government; rather, 
she must file a qui tam complaint under seal and serve it only upon the 
government.17 The FCA provides an initial sixty-day period for the gov-
ernment to evaluate the fraud allegations.18 To obtain longer than sixty 
days to conduct its investigation, the FCA permits the government to file 
an ex parte application asking the court to keep the case under seal for 
additional time.19 These extensions allow the government to continue its 
investigation of the relator’s fraud allegations and make an election to 
either intervene and take over the suit, or decline and allow the relator to 
proceed alone.20 Pursuant to the FCA, the government may make as 
                                                            
 13. Id. at 232. 
 14. E.g., United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(“The FCA is the government’s ‘primary litigation tool’ for recovering losses resulting from 
fraud.”); Avco Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 884 F.2d 621, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“The False 
Claims Act is the government’s primary litigative tool for the recovery of losses sustained as the 
result of fraud against the government.”). 
 15. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS—OVERVIEW, OCT. 1, 1987–SEPT. 30, 2014 
(Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter FRAUD STATISTICS], available at http://www.taf.org/DOJ-FCA-
Statistics-2014.pdf. In addition, since 1986 and through 2014, the DOJ has recovered $44.7 billion 
under the FCA. Of this amount, $30.2 billion or 67.6% was from qui tam cases brought by relators. 
Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1), (2) (2012). 
 18. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2012). 
 19. Id. 
 20. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (2012) (“Before the expiration of the 60-day period or any exten-
sions obtained under paragraph (3), the Government shall—(A) proceed with the action, in which 
case the action shall be conducted by the Government; or (B) notify the court that it declines to take 
over the action, in which case the person bringing the action shall have the right to conduct the ac-
tion.”). 
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many requests for extensions as needed, provided a showing of “good 
cause” supports the requests.21 Although the FCA does not define good 
cause, the overall structure and goal of the FCA is geared towards per-
mitting the government sufficient time to use the investigative tools and 
subpoenas for documents and testimony before making a decision to in-
tervene.22 These investigative devices are needed because, depending 
upon the complexity of the allegations, it can take the government sever-
al years to complete a fraud investigation.23 
Despite the importance of an investigation, some courts have re-
fused to grant the government sufficient time to utilize the discovery 
tools available under the FCA to investigate allegations contained in a 
qui tam complaint. This refusal frustrates the ability of the government to 
recover a greater portion of the funds lost to fraud. This has the effect of 
both artificially imposing a shorter statute of limitations and eliminating 
the use of civil investigative demand (CID)24 devices, and ultimately de-
feats the purpose of the FCA, resulting in fraudfeasors improperly keep-
ing billions of dollars in taxpayers’ funds without a resolution on the 
merits. 
As discussed above, the need for whistleblowers is obvious. The 
need for a full investigation by the government is also just as clear. When 
the government intervenes in qui tam cases, it obtains a recovery 95% of 
the time.25 In cases where the government declines to intervene, the rela-
tor is permitted to continue alone on behalf of the government, but only 
obtains recovery in 5% of cases.26 Therefore, it is imperative that the 
government be given a full opportunity to elect whether to intervene 
                                                            
 21. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3) (2012) (“The Government may, for good cause shown, move the 
court for extensions of the time during which the complaint remains under seal under paragraph (2). 
Any such motions may be supported by affidavits or other submissions in camera.”). 
 22. See 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (2012). See also infra Part III.A. 
 23. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FALSE CLAIMS ACT: INFORMATION ON FALSE 
CLAIMS ACT LITIGATION 31 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/93999.pdf. As 
discussed in Part V, a typical fraud investigation lasts three years, while complex investigations take 
six years, and extremely large or extremely complex cases have lasted eight years. 
 24. 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (2012). See also infra Part III.A. The FCA contains a provision that au-
thorizes the Attorney General to issue Civil Investigative Demands (CIDs) to compel a person or 
entity suspected of violating the FCA to produce documents, answer written interrogatories, or give 
oral testimony. 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (a)(1)(A)–(C) (2009). However, a CID may only be issued prior to 
the government filing its own FCA complaint or intervening in a relator’s qui tam complaint—while 
the qui tam case is under seal. 
 25. JOEL D. HESCH, WHISTLEBLOWING: REWARDS FOR REPORTING FRAUD AGAINST THE 
GOVERNMENT 103 (2013) [hereinafter HESCH, WHISTLEBLOWING] (“[O]ver 95 percent of whistle-
blowers receiv[e] rewards in cases where DOJ intervenes.”). 
 26. Id. at 104 (“Over 95 percent of cases DOJ declines, the whistleblower does not receive a 
reward at all.”). 
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when a relator files a qui tam complaint, as permitted under the FCA. 
This requires that the government have time to fully investigate the alle-
gations and make an informed decision to pursue the case. Indeed, the 
FCA permits the government to issue subpoenas for documents and even 
take deposition testimony as part of its investigation without first obtain-
ing court permission.27 When the investigation is cut short, the default is 
that the government will decline the case and rely upon the relator to 
pursue and prove by herself that the government was defrauded, which is 
rarely a success. Consequently, when a court denies the government a 
full investigation, the accused fraudfeasor is de facto allowed to keep the 
federal funds. 
Unfortunately, an increasing number of courts are becoming re-
sistant to granting the government’s requests for more time to retain the 
seal and investigate qui tam allegations by improperly imposing a 
heightened standard for good cause beyond the intent or goals of the 
FCA.28 Sadly, the government ends up declining many qui tam fraud al-
legations based on time limits instead of merits.29 In fact, the government 
declines nearly 80% of all qui tam cases.30 
There are two problems stemming from courts’ improper under-
standing and application of the FCA’s good cause requirement. First, 
some courts are applying a standard for approving extensions of the seal 
that is neither correct nor uniform. As a result, the amount of time grant-
ed to the government to conduct its investigations varies widely, and is 
dependent upon which part of the country a federal qui tam case is filed 
or which particular judge is assigned.31 For instance, in some jurisdic-
tions, courts routinely place qui tam cases on administrative hold so that 
                                                            
 27. 31 U.S.C. § 3733(a)(1) (2012) (“Whenever the Attorney General, or a designee (for pur-
poses of this section), has reason to believe that any person may be in possession, custody, or control 
of any documentary material or information relevant to a false claims law investigation, the Attorney 
General, or a designee, may, before commencing a civil proceeding under section 3730(a) or other 
false claims law, or making an election under section 3730(b), issue in writing and cause to be 
served upon such person, a civil investigative demand requiring such person—(A) to produce such 
documentary material for inspection and copying, (B) to answer in writing written interrogatories 
with respect to such documentary material or information, (C) to give oral testimony concerning 
such documentary material or information, or (D) to furnish any combination of such material, an-
swers, or testimony.”). 
 28. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 29. As indicated, the government declines 80% of cases. Although the government does not 
state a reason why it is declining, courts have noted: “The Justice Department may have myriad 
reasons for permitting the private suit to go forward including limited prosecutorial resources and 
confidence in the relator’s attorney.” United States ex rel. Chandler v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 277 F.3d 
969, 974 n.5 (7th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 538 U.S. 119 (2003). 
 30. Hesch, Zone of Protection, supra note 1, at 418. 
 31. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
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these unique cases do not count negatively towards judges as long-
pending cases.32 In those locations, the government can investigate the 
allegations for many years.33 Other courts keep the cases on their active 
docket sheets, but willingly grant years of extension requests, provided 
the government shows that its investigation remains active and ongo-
ing.34 Still other courts grant only limited amounts of time, such as be-
tween six and eighteen months.35 
The second problem resulting from a lack of a proper standard is 
that there is a trend by some courts to drastically restrict the amount of 
time permitted to investigate complex fraud allegations. At least one 
court has issued a standing order that seeks to limit most cases to sixty 
days.36 The order specifically states that neither informal discovery nor 
settlement negotiations will be considered sufficient grounds for extend-
ing the seal period. The judge further noted that the court will determine, 
“as commanded by the statute, whether the government has shown ‘good 
cause.’” However, the judge provided no guidance regarding what con-
stitutes good cause. 
The basic concern is that some courts restrict the investigation time 
so severely that it effectively prevents the government from conducting a 
proper investigation. Indeed, some courts cut the time so short that it pre-
cludes the use of the CIDs.37 Accordingly, declining to extend the seal 
until the government has completed its investigation basically results in 
not only an automatic declination, but also the defendant keeping the 
taxpayers’ funds without any resolution on the merits. 
When a whistleblower does not seek a reward by filing a qui tam 
suit, the only limitation on the government is the FCA’s two-tiered stat-
ute of limitations, which provides for a minimum of six years and is ex-
tended to ten years if the government files suit within three years of 
                                                            
 32. Both while working for the DOJ and in private practice representing relators, the author 
was aware of numerous districts where qui tam cases were placed on administrative hold upon the 
request of DOJ during the pendency of its investigation. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Mallavarapu v. 
Acadiana Cardiology, LLC, No. CIV.A.04-732, 2010 WL 3896425, at *16–17 (W.D. La. Aug. 16, 
2010). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Standing Order, In Re All Qui Tam Actions Filed Under the Federal False Claims Act 
Pending on the Docket of United States District Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., 3:13-mc-452-JFA 
(D.S.C. Nov. 18, 2013), available at http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/south-
carolina/scdce/3:2013mc00452/206011/1. 
 37. See supra note 24. 
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learning of the fraud allegations.38 On the other hand, when a relator files 
a qui tam suit, the case remains under seal as long as the court grants the 
government’s motions to extend the seal beyond the initial sixty days 
upon a showing of good cause. Thus, the question is whether Congress 
intended to shorten the investigatory time merely because a reward is 
sought. As the following hypotheticals indicate, it would be illogical for 
Congress to allow the government to enlist whistleblowers through the 
qui tam reward mechanism, but allow courts to arbitrarily cut off the 
government’s investigatory tools by narrowly interpreting good cause for 
extensions of the seal, thus severely restricting the amount of time the 
government has to investigate qui tam complaints. The hypotheticals 
highlight the need for a uniform and correct interpretation of the term 
good cause for granting additional time to investigate the allegations un-
der seal. 
First, suppose a whistleblower calls a hotline to report a hospital 
committing Medicare fraud. Under the FCA, the government has at least 
six years (or in some instances ten years) from the date of the false claim 
to file an FCA complaint.39 During that time, the government does not 
need court permission to take informal discovery utilizing the FCA’s 
CID provisions.40 
Second, suppose instead the same whistleblower with the same 
facts desired to obtain a reward for reporting the fraud, so she filed a qui 
tam complaint (a prerequisite to obtaining a reward under the FCA). In 
that situation, the FCA requires a court to keep the case under seal for at 
least sixty days, and longer upon request and a showing of good cause.41 
During this period, the FCA permits the government to conduct the exact 
same informal discovery under the CID provisions prior to making a de-
cision to intervene in the qui tam complaint, including issuing subpoenas 
for documents or deposition testimony.42 
In the first hypothetical, the government has at least six unfettered 
years from the date of the alleged misconduct to conduct informal dis-
covery without court permission, merely because the whistleblower did 
                                                            
 38. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b) (2012) (“A civil action under section 3730 may not be brought . . . (1) 
more than 6 years after the date on which the violation of section 3729 is committed, or (2) more 
than 3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should 
have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the cir-
cumstances, but in no event more than 10 years after the date on which the violation is committed, 
whichever occurs last.”). See discussion infra Part V. 
 39. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b) (2012). 
 40. Id. 
 41. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2012). 
 42. 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (2012). 
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not ask for a reward for reporting the fraud.43 The only difference in the 
second hypothetical is that the whistleblower wanted a reward, and by 
law, had to file a qui tam suit to be eligible. 
The second hypothetical’s result may be drastically different de-
pending solely upon where the case is filed due to the different standards 
being applied to the good cause requirement for extensions of the seal. 
For instance, if a court too strictly interprets good cause, then the court 
will likely cut short the government’s investigation and limit the gov-
ernment to somewhere between sixty days and eighteen months, which 
often results in the case being declined based on time limits.44 On the 
other hand, if the judge correctly views the good cause element as more 
of a procedural device to help ensure that the government’s investigation 
is still active or ongoing, then the government is permitted the time it 
takes to make a decision on the merits instead of declining because of 
time constraints. 
Assume that in the first hypothetical the government spent five 
years investigating the hotline allegations and an additional eleven 
months negotiating a settlement resulting in a recovery of $10 million. In 
this scenario, the government fully investigated the allegations and even 
reached a settlement without any court filings or approvals. Assume in 
the second hypothetical the court denied the government more than 
eighteen months to investigate the allegations because of the court’s def-
inition of good cause. Because the government had not finished its inves-
tigation, it was not willing to publically accuse the hospital of Medicare 
fraud and therefore declined to intervene in the case. Because the relator 
lacks the resources to fight the hospital in what will be protracted and 
complex fraud allegations,45 assume the relator dismisses the action. 
Thus, in the second scenario, the defendant keeps the $10 million and 
there is never any determination regarding the merits of the fraud allega-
tions. 
The only difference in the two cases is that the court cut short the 
government’s investigation. Congress did not intend to eliminate the 
government’s ability to utilize the FCA’s investigatory subpoena powers 
by allowing courts to significantly reduce the time available to investi-
gate complex fraud allegations solely because a whistleblower sought a 
reward and filed a qui tam complaint. Indeed, Congress enacted the qui 
                                                            
 43. Id. 
 44. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 45. Hesch, Zone of Protection, supra note 1, at 402–03 (“[T]he DOJ declines to intervene in 
over three-fourths of all qui tam cases due to lack of resources. Relators also often lack the necessary 
resources to continue when the DOJ declines a case.”). 
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tam provisions to broaden the reach of the FCA and give the government 
more opportunities to recover more funds lost due to fraud. It would be 
illogical to view the qui tam provisions in such a manner that they curtail 
the government’s investigation. 
This Article proposes a standard for determining whether the 
FCA’s “good cause” requirement is satisfied. Part II introduces key pro-
visions of the FCA that provide for extensions to the initial sixty-day seal 
period. Part III discusses the importance of the seal period. Part IV gath-
ers cases where courts have granted or denied extensions and addresses 
the inconsistencies between the various courts. Part V proposes a uni-
form standard for determining good cause when the government requests 
an extension of the seal to complete its fraud investigation. Specifically, 
it argues that extensions of the seal should be liberally granted for up to 
three years for typical fraud allegations. During this period, the govern-
ment need only show that its investigation remains active and ongoing. 
After three years, the government can obtain additional extensions of up 
to three additional years, provided that more time is needed due to the 
size or complexity of the case, other circumstances requiring more time 
than a typical fraud investigation, or the government obtaining a partial 
lifting of the seal. Part VI addresses a related issue regarding the statute 
of limitations for FCA claims and the “relation back” of the govern-
ment’s intervention to the initial complaint filed by the relator, and ex-
plains why Congress did not intend the statute of limitations to be a fac-
tor when deciding whether to grant extensions of the seal. Part VII con-
cludes. 
II. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN QUI TAM SUITS 
The False Claims Act (FCA) was created to allow ordinary citizens 
to aid in the detection of fraud committed against the government.46 The 
qui tam statute allows private individuals, known as relators, to file suit 
on behalf of the United States and recover a percentage of any awarded 
recovery.47 Since Congress performed a major overhaul on the False 
Claims Act in 1986, the Act has become the leading weapon for fighting 
fraud against the federal government.48 Following the 1986 amendments, 
and through 2013, the FCA has led to the recovery of over $38 billion in 
taxpayers’ dollars.49 To participate as a relator and have a chance at re-
                                                            
 46. Hesch, Breaking the Siege, supra note 1, at 230. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See discussion supra notes 14–16. 
 49. See supra note 15. 
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covery, the individual must obtain his own attorney and follow the statu-
tory requirements of the FCA.50 
The FCA makes it a violation to knowingly present, or cause to be 
presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.51 Relators 
who suspect fraud has occurred must file a detailed complaint and serve 
on the government a statement of all material evidence.52 The FCA re-
quires that the “complaint must be filed under seal,”53 which means that 
all records relating to the case must be kept on a secret docket by the 
clerk of the court. “Copies of the complaint are given only to the United 
States Department of Justice (DOJ), including the local United States 
Attorney, and to the assigned judge of the district court.”54 The qui tam 
complaint remains sealed for a minimum of sixty days,55 during which 
time the DOJ investigates the relator’s allegation. Before the seal period 
expires, the government must either decide whether to intervene, or, for 
good cause, seek an extension of the seal period.56 While sixty days is the 
minimum allotted time for a complaint to remain under seal, the statute 
contains no limit to how long the case may remain under seal.57 Rather, 
the FCA established a process whereby the government must seek exten-
sions beyond sixty days.58 Once the government has decided whether it 
will intervene, a court order will be entered to unseal the complaint, 
which is then served on the defendant. 
If the government chooses to intervene, the relator may continue to 
participate in the case, however the government will do the bulk of the 
work. If the government does not intervene, the relator may proceed 
without the aid of the government.59 However, the government may still 
                                                            
 50. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012). 
 51. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Holder, 673 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(a)(1)). 
 52. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2012). 
 53. Id. 
 54. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FALSE CLAIMS ACT CASES: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN QUI 
TAM (WHISTLEBLOWER) SUITS, available at https://www.doioig.gov/docs/falseclaimsact.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2014). 
 55. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2012). 
 56. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2), (3) (2012). 
 57. JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS § 4.04[B], at 4-166 (3d ed. 
2008, 2009-1 Supp.). 
 58. CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT § 11.17 
(2d ed. 2010 & Supp. 2014). 
 59. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2012). In nearly every instance, the government seeks at least one 
extension. 
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file a motion to intervene at a later date upon a showing of good cause.60 
Whether the government intervenes has a significant effect on the likeli-
hood of success—in over 95% of cases in which the government inter-
venes it obtains a recovery. By contrast, in cases where the government 
declines to intervene, only 5% result in recovery.61 Thus, it is critical that 
the government has sufficient time to investigate the relator’s claims be-
fore deciding whether to accept or decline the case. 
III. IMPORTANCE OF THE SEAL PERIOD 
The seal functions to “allow[] the qui tam relator to start the judicial 
wheels in motion and protect his litigative rights, while allowing the 
government the opportunity to study and evaluate the relator’s infor-
mation for possible intervention in the qui tam action or in relation to an 
overlapping criminal investigation.”62 As such, the seal period is the 
government’s primary tool to separate the wheat from the chaff without 
tipping off the defendant. 
In addition to allowing the government to investigate the relator’s 
claims in secrecy, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the seal 
period serves other functions: 
(1) to permit the United States to determine whether it already was 
investigating the fraud allegations (either criminally or civilly); (2) 
to permit the United States to investigate the allegations to decide 
whether to intervene; (3) to prevent an alleged fraudster from being 
tipped off about an investigation; and, (4) to protect the reputation 
of a defendant in that the defendant is named in a fraud action 
brought in the name of the United States, but the United States has 
not yet decided whether to intervene.63 
Thus, the legislature adopted the seal period not only to best serve the 
interest of detecting fraud against the government, but also to protect the 
subjects of qui tam claims.64 
Much like a grand jury investigation, the need for secrecy in a qui 
tam investigation contemplates that the relators will share information 
                                                            
 60. Id. Under the FCA, if the government intervenes, a relator receives a minimum of 15% and 
up to 25% of the judgment amount. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2010). If the government declines to 
join the suit, the relator receives an even higher amount of 25% to 30%. Id. at § 3730(d)(2) (2010). 
 61. HESCH, WHISTLEBLOWING, supra note 25, at 140. 
 62. United States ex rel. Howard v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 1:99-CV-285, 2007 WL 
1513999, at *1 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (quoting United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 67 
F.3d 242, 245 (9th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 63. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Holder, 673 F.3d 245, 249–50 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing S. REP. 
NO. 99-345, at 24–25 (1986)). 
 64. Id. 
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with the government in a manner that avoids tipping off the targets of the 
investigation.65 Not only is a relator authorized to produce inside infor-
mation to the government, but he must do so in “secrecy.”66 Because the 
Attorney General is responsible for investigating both criminal and civil 
fraud violations of federal laws, whenever the Attorney General receives 
a copy of a qui tam complaint, he shares the complaint with both the civil 
and criminal divisions of the DOJ.67 Hence, a person who files qui tam is 
simultaneously reporting potential civil and criminal violations for fraud 
against the government. Indeed, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
noted, “the public policy interest at stake[,] the reporting of possible 
crimes to the authorities[,] is one of the highest order.”68 
A. The FCA’s Civil Investigative Demand Provisions Require Sufficient 
Time to Investigate 
In 1986, Congress overhauled the FCA due to a rise in fraud in the 
“1980s when the military paid $600 for toilet seats and $748 for pliers.”69 
One of the special features added was a section entitled Civil Investiga-
tive Demands (CID).70 The CID provision authorized the Attorney Gen-
eral to issue CIDs to compel a person or entity suspected of violating the 
FCA to produce documents, answer written interrogatories, or give oral 
testimony.71 The purpose of the FCA’s CID provision was “to remove 
barriers to the Government’s investigation of civil fraud cases prior to 
the Government’s filing of a case.”72 Unfortunately, because CIDs had to 
be issued by the Attorney General and certain other restrictions applied, 
                                                            
 65. United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quot-
ing S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 24, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5289). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 673 F.3d at 250. 
 68. Fomby-Denson v. Dep’t of the Army, 247 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing W.R. 
Grace & Co., v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)). 
 69. Hesch, Zone of Protection, supra note 1, at 364 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 70. 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (2012). 
 71. “Whenever the Attorney General, or a designee (for purposes of this section), has reason to 
believe that any person may be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material or 
information relevant to a false claims law investigation, the Attorney General, or a designee, may, 
before commencing a civil proceeding under section 3730(a) or other false claims law, or making an 
election under section 3730(b), issue in writing and cause to be served upon such person, a civil 
investigative demand requiring such person—(A) to produce such documentary material for inspec-
tion and copying, (B) to answer in writing written interrogatories with respect to such documentary 
material or information, (C) to give oral testimony concerning such documentary material or infor-
mation, or (D) to furnish any combination of such material, answers, or testimony.” 31 U.S.C. § 
3733 (a)(1)(A)–(C) (2009) (emphasis added). 
 72. SYLVIA, supra note 58, at § 10.70. 
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they were rarely used.73 In addition, this new provision stated that a CID 
must be issued before commencing an FCA suit, and it was unsettled 
whether this meant that it could be used in a qui tam action.74 
In 2009, Congress amended the CID provision of the FCA to re-
move all of these barriers.75 In addition to delegating authority to issue 
CIDs,76 the 2009 amendments also clarified that CIDs may be issued af-
ter a qui tam case has been filed provided they are utilized before the 
government makes an intervention decision.77 
The critical point for purposes of this Article is that CIDs must be 
issued prior to making an intervention decision in a qui tam case.78 Ac-
cordingly, Congress intended the seal period to be long enough to enable 
the government to draft and serve document requests and interrogatories, 
and take depositions—a process that can take several months.79 Moreo-
ver, the seal period must be long enough for the defendants to respond to 
CIDs and produce required items; this also can take many months. Final-
ly, the seal period must be long enough to enable the government to uti-
lize the information—another process that can take several more months. 
It is also common for a defendant to want to discuss the information and 
allegations with the government before the government intervenes and 
publicly accuses the defendant of committing fraud against the govern-
ment. All told, the CID and related investigative process can often take a 
few years. 
Thus, the fact that the FCA contains an initial sixty-day period, fol-
lowed by the ability to request additional time upon a showing of good 
cause, is not an attempt to limit an investigation to sixty days or even a 
few months, but merely represents a process by which the government 
must periodically show that it is still actively investigating the allega-
tions. Indeed, the 2009 amendments specifically strengthened the availa-
bility and use of CIDs, which demonstrates that Congress intended that 
the government would be provided sufficient time to fully use these tools 
                                                            
 73. See id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. See also 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (a)(1)(A)–(C) (2009). 
 76. Prior to the amendment, only the Attorney General could issue a CID. This amendment 
permitted the Attorney General to delegate to U.S. Attorneys the authority to issue CIDs. 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3733 (a)(1)(A)–(C) (2009). As a result, the use of CIDs has increased. 
 77. 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (a)(1)(A)–(C) (2009). 
 78. SYLVIA, supra note 58, at § 10.71. 
 79. E.g., 31 U.S.C.§ 3733 (a)(2)(B)(ii) (2009) (the CID for documents must “prescribe a return 
date for each such class which will provide a reasonable period of time within which the material so 
demanded may be assembled and made available for inspection and copying”); id. at § 3733(h)(4) 
(when taking a CID deposition, the government must provide “a reasonable opportunity to examine 
and read the transcript” of at least thirty days). 
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and conduct a complete investigation before making an intervention de-
cision in a qui tam case. Again, a CID can only be issued in a qui tam 
case prior to government intervention.80 It is illogical to read the good 
cause provision for extending the seal to be a shorter time period than it 
takes to utilize CIDs authorized in the same statute. 
In reality, it takes years for the government to properly investigate 
fraud allegations. A government report found that “[c]ases in which DOJ 
intervened took a median of 38 months to conclude and ranged from 4 
months to 187 months.”81 Large, complex, or multijurisdictional cases 
can require a significantly longer seal period, with many cases requiring 
that the complaints remain sealed for many years. For instance, a recent 
large qui tam case was kept under seal for eight years. In 2012, Glax-
oSmithKline LLC agreed to pay $2 billion to settle allegations that it vio-
lated the FCA by unlawfully promoting certain prescription drugs.82 The 
settlement was based upon four qui tam suits, the first of which was filed 
in 2003, and they were each combined into one complaint when the gov-
ernment intervened in October 2011, amounting to a seal of eight years.83 
Other large cases have been kept under seal for five or six years. For in-
stance, a qui tam case filed in 200784 remained under seal until May 
2013, when Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. agreed to settle the qui tam case 
for $350 million.85 In 2012, the government consolidated, unsealed, and 
settled four qui tam suits, the first of which was filed five years prior, 
against Abbott Laboratories pursuant to a global FCA settlement in the 
amount of $800 million.86 In 2009, the government asked to unseal a qui 
tam case filed five years prior and announced an FCA settlement with 
                                                            
 80. SYLVIA, supra note 58, at § 10.71. 
 81. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-320R, INFORMATION ON FALSE CLAIMS 
ACT LITIGATION 3 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/93999.pdf. 
 82. GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and 
Failure to Report Safety Data, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 2, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-civ-842.html. 
 83. See id.; GLAXOSMITHKLINE SETTLEMENT FACT SHEET, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
(2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-ma/legacy/2012/10/09/Settlement 
_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
 84. The qui tam was filed in April 2007. GSK SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/692013513142957691677.pdf. 
 85. Generic Drug Manufacturer Ranbaxy Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay $500 Million to 
Resolve False Claims Allegations, cGMP Violations and False Statements to the FDA, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE (May 13, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/generic-drug-manufacturer-ranbaxy-
pleads-guilty-and-agrees-pay-500-million-resolve-false. 
 86. See Abbott Labs to Pay $1.5 Billion to Resolve Criminal & Civil Investigations of Off-label 
Promotion of Depakote, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 7, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/ 
May/12-civ-585.html; ABBOTT LABS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
(2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012/05/07/Settlement 
Agreement.pdf. 
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Quest Diagnostics in the amount of $302 million.87 In 2004, the first of 
nine qui tam suits was filed against Pfizer, Inc., all of which were consol-
idated and unsealed when the government announced a global FCA set-
tlement five years later in the amount of $1 billion.88 In addition, this 
Article discusses numerous other cases where the seal was extended be-
tween four and nine years.89 
In short, the actual investigation period for cases in which the gov-
ernment intervenes can take three years for standard cases and six years 
for large and complex cases, and even as much as eight years in a rare 
situations.90 
B. Governmental Agencies’ Procedural Processes Take Additional Time 
Leaving aside the time it takes to conduct the factual investigation 
discussed above, the amount of time it takes for the government to make 
an intervention decision is also lengthened by the internal procedural 
processes of the Attorney General’s office and the various affected gov-
ernmental agencies. These procedural processes are time consuming and 
take months to conclude, regardless of the complexity of the allegations. 
The FCA requires that the relator serve a copy of the qui tam complaint 
upon both the Attorney General91 and the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
                                                            
 87. Quest Diagnostics to Pay U.S. $302 Million to Resolve Allegations That a Subsidiary Sold 
Misbranded Test Kits, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 5, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/quest-
diagnostics-pay-us-302-million-resolve-allegations-subsidiary-sold-misbranded-test-kits. 
 88. PFIZER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/Pfizer/Pfizer%20Settlement%20Agreement.pdf. 
 89. See infra notes 114, 150, 151, 159, 162, and 164. 
 90. The context of allowing the government sufficient time to conduct a full investigation is 
also shaped by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Courts have universally held that FCA com-
plaints must satisfy the strict pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), which requires the complaint to 
“state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
Courts universally apply the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) to FCA cases, and fre-
quently dismiss qui tam cases based upon varying strict standards. See Charis Ann Mitchell, Com-
ment, A Fraudulent Scheme’s Particularity Under Rule 9(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 4 LIBERTY L. REV. 337 (2010). This heightened standard of pleading requires a more thorough 
investigation of a relator’s claims. Following a thorough investigation, the government may need to 
amend the complaint to ensure that the pleading standard is met. Sixty days is simply not a sufficient 
time period to investigate possible fraud claims and plead each with sufficient particularity. This 
means that with respect to complex fraud allegations, which typically involve hundreds of false 
claims over many years, the complaint must state the who, what, why, when, and how of each fraud 
allegation. See id. at 356. Thus, a thorough investigation is needed. 
 91. Hesch, Breaking the Siege, supra note 1, at 265 (“[T]he Attorney General [is] the only 
government official with authority to compromise an FCA case or common-law fraud claim.”) The 
Attorney General and his delegated agents have the exclusive authority to enforce the FCA and to 
prosecute claims for fraud on the government. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012) (stating that FCA claims 
can only be brought by the Attorney General or a private person suing in the name of the United 
States); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3711(b)(1) (2008) (providing that agencies are permitted to settle and 
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(USAO) where the complaint was filed.92 By law, the Attorney General 
is the only government official with authority to settle an FCA case.93 
However, the Attorney General delegated authority to certain attorneys 
in DOJ offices in Washington, D.C.; these offices are the Civil Division, 
Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Division (DOJ Civil Frauds), and 
in cases under certain dollar thresholds, to USAOs nationwide.94 
Once a qui tam complaint is served on the Attorney General, the 
DOJ Civil Frauds attorney assigned to the case will contact the assigned 
Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) to coordinate the particular roles of 
each office.95 Cases under $1 million are typically delegated to the 
USAO.96 In most cases where the allegations exceed $1 million, the case 
is jointly handled between DOJ Civil Frauds and the USAO.97 The DOJ 
Civil Frauds attorney and the AUSA (collectively “DOJ attorneys”) re-
view the qui tam complaint and the relator’s statement of material evi-
dence in support.98 Next, “the DOJ attorneys will contact the affected 
                                                                                                                                     
compromise certain claims but not fraud claims); 28 C.F.R. § 0.45(d) (2008) (assigning common law 
fraud claims to the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division). The Assistant Attorney General may 
delegate authority to certain attorneys in the DOJ offices in Washington, D.C., and in cases with 
certain dollar thresholds to the USAO nationwide. 28 C.F.R. pt. 0, subpt. Y, app. (2011). 
 92. The FCA requires: “A copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all 
material evidence and information the person possesses shall be served on the Government pursuant 
to Rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2012). Rule 4 
requires service upon both the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the Attorney General. FED. R. CIV. P. 
4(i)(1)(A)–(B). 
 93. Hesch, Breaking the Siege, supra note 1, at 265. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012) (stating that 
FCA claims can only be brought by the Attorney General or a private person suing in the name of 
the United States); see also id. § 3711(b)(1) (providing that agencies are permitted to settle and 
compromise certain claims but not fraud claims); 28 C.F.R. § 0.45(d) (2011) (assigning common law 
fraud claims to the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division). 
 94. 28 C.F.R. pt. 0, subpt. Y, app. (2011) (assigning FCA cases where damages will not exceed 
$1,000,000 to the USAO). 
 95. Id. at § 1(b) (delegating FCA cases where damages will not exceed $1,000,000 to the 
USAO and allowing the USAO to accept settlement offers “in which the gross amount of the origi-
nal claim does not exceed $5,000,000, so long as the difference between the gross amount of the 
original claim and the proposed settlement does not exceed $1,000,000”). 
 96. Id. 
 97. HESCH, WHISLTEBLOWING, supra note 25, at 105. (“Depending upon the size and complex-
ity, the case will be placed into one of four categories: personally handled by DOJ Civil Frauds[;] 
jointly handled between both offices[;] primarily assigned to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and moni-
tored by DOJ Civil Frauds[; or] specifically delegated to the U.S. Attorney’s Office.”); see also id. 
(“The two offices will collectively decide the best handling on a case-by-case basis. However, under 
a civil directive, cases with damages under $1 million are routinely delegated to the U.S. Attorney’s 
Offices, with assistance being freely provided by DOJ Civil Frauds upon request. A case over $1 
million can be handled by the U.S. Attorney’s Office and monitored by DOJ Civil Frauds. But ex-
pect DOJ Civil Frauds to remain actively involved in the larger and more complex cases. In all in-
stances where a case is not delegated, DOJ Civil Frauds must be involved in approving intervention, 
settlement, or the amount of a whistleblower reward.”). 
 98. Id. 
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government[] agency where the fraud occurred in order to [apprise] it of 
the allegations, solicit input, and request investigative and auditing sup-
port.”99 In fact, before the DOJ attorneys can make a formal intervention 
decision, they must seek input and a recommendation from the affected 
government agency, such as the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Ser-
vices or the Department of Defense.100 “During this agency review pro-
cess, the agency will enlist a myriad of its own program officials to eval-
uate the case, such as quality assurance representatives or other knowl-
edgeable witnesses.”101 
Finally, once the DOJ attorneys obtain a recommendation from the 
affected agencies, they must obtain formal approval from DOJ officials 
possessing actual authority to approve a recommendation.102 To obtain 
formal approval, DOJ attorneys prepare a memorandum, which is re-
viewed by a supervisor and signed by the Director of the Civil Fraud 
Section. After the DOJ Attorney drafts a memo, it typically takes three to 
five weeks for DOJ to formally sign off on an intervention memo. In sum 
total, even if the allegations lack merit or were easy to investigate, it can 
take three to five weeks simply for the procedural processes to occur. 
This period is in addition to the time required to conduct the factual in-
vestigation, which can take up to three years for standard cases and six 
years or longer for large and complex cases. 
C. The Legislative History is Not Controlling and Fails to Account for 
True Investigative Efforts and Time 
Within the FCA’s legislative history, a Senate Report suggested 
that the initial sixty-day period should be sufficient time to conduct an 
investigation.103 Specifically, it stated, 
The Committee intends that courts weigh carefully any extensions 
on the period of time in which the Government has to decide 
whether to intervene and take over the litigation. The Committee 
feels that with the vast majority of cases, 60 days is an adequate 
amount of time to allow Government coordination, review and deci-
sion. Consequently, “good cause” would not be established merely 
                                                            
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. The author was a DOJ attorney for over fifteen years, and therefore has firsthand experi-
ence with the internal process of seeking government approval for intervening in qui tam cases. 
 103. S. REP. NO. 99-345 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266. 
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upon a showing that the Government was overburdened and had not 
had a chance to address the complaint.104 
However, history and the reality of fraud investigations have 
proved this generic assumption incorrect. Indeed, there are multiple rea-
sons why these few statements in the legislative history should not be 
given weight. First, as shown above, the actual factual investigation can 
take up to three years for standard cases and six years (or longer) for 
large and complex cases. Second, the FCA’s CID provisions, which were 
strengthened by a 2009 amendment, can only be used during the seal pe-
riod and would be effectively eliminated by a sixty-day limit on investi-
gation.105 Third, the procedural process of obtaining authority to make an 
election decision takes three to five weeks, which is in addition to the 
time required for the factual investigation. Fourth, the heightened plead-
ing requirements of Rule 9(b) applies to qui tam cases, which also de-
mands a more complete investigation than is possible in such a short 
amount of time.106 
Finally, the assumptions in the legislative history that such a short 
amount of time would be sufficient should also be ignored because they 
are simply incorrect predictions based upon a lack of information. In-
deed, by 1986, at the time of the Senate Report, very few qui tam cases 
had been filed under the FCA. In fact, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Stuart Schiffer estimated that before the proposed amendments to the 
FCA, DOJ had recovered $60 million for all FCA cases.107 The 1986 
amendments sparked drastic change in FCA recovery. The differences in 
the size and complexity of qui tam cases would start and continue to 
grow steadily until today. The total qui tam recoveries during the first 
five years of the new FCA, 1987 through 1991, amounted to $128 mil-
lion, which was more than double the preamendment history of the 
FCA.108 The upward trend continued each year, culminating in settle-
ments of over $14 billion for qui tam cases for the five-year period of 
                                                            
 104. Id. at 24–25. 
 105. See 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (a)(1)(A)–(C) (2009). 
 106. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 107. False Claims Reforms Act: Hearing on S. 1562 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice 
and Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 28 (1985) (statement of Stuart Schiffer, 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/03/30/hear-j-99-52-1985.pdf. In addition, as stated 
earlier, from 1943 until 1986, there were only six qui tam suits brought per year. See source cited 
supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 108. See FRAUD STATISTICS, supra note 15. Not surprisingly, there were no recoveries during 
1987, which was the first year after the 1986 amendments, and only $2 million recovered in 1988, 
because of the time it takes to investigate and settle fraud cases. Id. 
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2010 through 2014.109 Today, the average qui tam case now exceeds $1 
million, with seventy-five individual cases exceeding $100 million, thir-
teen exceeding $500 million, and four exceeding $1 billion.110 
Needless to say, it takes considerably more time to investigate to-
day’s larger and more complex cases. Therefore, the concept of good 
cause cannot remain stagnant or be dependent upon the comments of a 
few congressmen in 1986 regarding what they predicted to be an appro-
priate amount of time to investigate allegations of fraud against the fed-
eral government. If anything, good cause must expand with the circum-
stances facing the government today, which includes a staggering esti-
mate that 10% of all government spending is being lost to fraud.111 Inves-
tigating and recouping even a fraction of the massive fraud that is taking 
place can hardly be achieved in sixty days or even six months. A particu-
lar fraudfeasor alleged to be cheating the government out of tens of mil-
lions of dollars today should not be allowed to escape a full investigation 
merely because in 1986 the size and complexity of cases were a mere 
fraction of what they are today. Fortunately, Congress had the wisdom to 
place within the FCA statute itself a “good cause” standard rather than a 
fixed amount of time so that the government can complete its investiga-
tions based upon the context and circumstances of each individual 
case.112 
The next Part reviews the cases in which courts have addressed the 
length of time a qui tam case should remain under seal, and points out 
how the lack of a uniform or statutory-based standard has resulted in 
vastly different and often incorrect rulings. Thereafter, Part V of this Ar-
ticle proposes a standard for good cause based upon the statutory lan-
guage of the FCA and its purposes and goals. 
IV. EXTENSIONS GRANTED FOR GOOD CAUSE 
While the FCA permits extensions of the investigatory seal period 
for “good cause,” it does not specify the standard by which good cause is 
to be measured. As such, the term has been open for interpretation by 
courts and the meaning drastically varies across jurisdictions. Many 
courts freely grant long extensions lasting many years, while a few are 
                                                            
 109. Id. 
 110. Top False Claims Act Cases by Civil Award Amount, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC. 
FUND, http://taf.org/general-resources/top-100-fca-cases (last visited Jan. 2, 2015). 
 111. Hesch, Zone of Protection, supra note 1, at 368–69; Hesch, Breaking the Siege, supra 
note 1, at 224. 
 112. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3) (2012). 
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beginning to refuse to grant any extensions.113 Often, even the courts that 
grant liberal extensions do so without ever defining good cause or partic-
ularizing the specific reasons the extensions were granted.114 The follow-
ing sections describe cases that have granted or denied requests for ex-
tensions of time. 
The United States Supreme Court has never addressed the standard 
for granting extensions to the seal period. Additionally, no circuit court 
of appeals has squarely addressed or defined what constitutes “good 
cause” for the government to extend the seal period. To better understand 
the problem, the cases discussing the extension of the seal period are dis-
cussed below. 
A. Early Court Responses to Requests to Extend the Seal 
In 1991, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois be-
came the first to address what may constitute good cause to extend the 
seal period.115 In U.S. ex rel. Kalish v. Desnick, the government sought 
an extension to the sixty-day seal period for an investigation that re-
quired coordinated efforts with the Department of Health and Human 
Services and the Office of the Inspector General.116 The initial extension 
request stated that additional time was needed to facilitate deliberations 
between the agencies regarding the relator’s allegations.117 Based on the 
government’s request, the court denied the request for extending the seal 
period, finding it “too lacking in specifics to show good cause for an ex-
tension.”118 Relying upon the 1986 legislative history, the court stated 
that the extensions “require more than a showing that the government 
                                                            
 113. United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 2d 618, 626 
(E.D. Tenn. 2012) (“[T]he Government is put ON NOTICE that, in all future qui tam proceedings 
under the False Claims Act, the Court will expect the Government to provide notice regarding its 
intervention within the statutorily mandated 60-day period.” (emphasis in original)). 
 114. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Grp., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 
1323, 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (seal in place for six years); United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-
Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 43 (D. Mass. 2001) (seal in place for almost four years); United States ex 
rel. Singh v. Bradford Reg’l Med. Ctr., Civil No. 04–186 Erie, 2007 WL 1576406, at *1 (W.D. Pa. 
May 31, 2007) (government obtained four extensions); United States v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 469 
F.3d 263, 266 (2d Cir. 2006) (under seal for eight years); United States ex rel. Yannacopolous v. 
Gen. Dynamics, 457 F. Supp. 2d 854, 857 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (under seal for seven years). 
 115. United States ex rel. Kalish v. Desnick, 765 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
 116. Id. at 1353–54. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1354. 
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had been unable to address the complaint.”119 As such, the court ordered 
that the complaint be unsealed.120 
On motion for reconsideration, the government filed a more specif-
ic motion, informing the court that the relator had only recently provided 
the DOJ with the critical statement of material evidence.121 As such, the 
government investigation would require additional time.122 However, the 
court found that the motion still lacked sufficient facts to show good 
cause to keep the case documents sealed.123 This case was the first to il-
lustrate that courts have very little guidance for determining whether ex-
tension requests establish good cause. 
A few years later, in 1994, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
faced the issue of whether the government’s failure to comply with the 
sixty-day seal period, subject to extensions for good cause, was a juris-
dictional bar.124 The district court had granted eight extensions of the seal 
for a total of twenty-one months prior to the government intervening.125 
Neither the court, nor the defendant, argued that twenty-one months was 
too long a time period. Rather, the defendant moved to dismiss the case 
based upon the fact that the government had missed two of the eight 
deadlines before filing motions for extensions. The defendant argued that 
the sixty-day timetable and any extensions granted were jurisdictional 
requirements and, therefore, once the government failed to timely inter-
vene, it was barred from doing so at a later point.126 
On appeal of the dismissal decision, the Fourth Circuit noted that 
the enactment of § 3730(b)(3) was not to ensure “that the government 
should be prevented from abusing the extension privilege, but rather that, 
because the intervention decision may at times require substantial, time-
consuming investigation, the government should not be bound in all cas-
es to a sixty-day period in deciding whether to intervene in qui tam ac-
tions.”127 The court further noted that “the public is best served by plac-
ing with the government the ‘primary responsibility for prosecuting 
[false claims] action[s].’”128 As such, the Fourth Circuit determined that 
                                                            
 119. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 24–25 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5289–90, 
Appendix B-2. 
 120. Kalish, 765 F. Supp. at 1354. 
 121. Id. at 1354–55. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 1356–57. The court did, however, find that because of the late filing of the SME, the 
government had additional time to decide whether to intervene after the seal was lifted. Id. 
 124. United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 125. Id. at 1341. 
 126. See id. at 1342. 
 127. Id. at 1345. 
 128. Id. at 1346 (emphasis omitted). 
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the case was improperly dismissed.129 Just one year later, a case out of 
the Eastern District of Missouri was permitted to remain under seal for 
nearly two full years.130 
District courts in California and Louisiana also faced the issue of 
how long a case could remain under seal in the late 1990s.131 In United 
States ex rel. Costa v. Baker & Taylor, Inc., the government requested an 
additional extension of the seal on a qui tam complaint that had been 
granted extensions and remained under seal for nearly eighteen months. 
The Northern District of California, however, improperly balanced the 
government’s interest in extending the seal against the interest of the de-
fendant in receiving notice of the claim and refused to allow the govern-
ment additional extensions of the seal period.132 In so doing, the court 
noted that “good cause” is a substantive requirement that can “only [be] 
satisf[ied] by stating a convincing rationale.”133 Unfortunately, the court 
provided no guidance regarding what might constitute a sufficiently con-
vincing rationale. The court also ignored several justifications offered by 
the government for an extension—including an ongoing criminal investi-
gation, insufficient time to make a decision, and interference with settle-
ment negotiations—before ultimately holding that the government had 
not met its burden of showing good cause.134 By denying the extension 
without properly evaluating good cause, the court essentially eliminated 
the statutory provision for extending the seal period. 
In similar fashion, a district court in Louisiana erroneously refused 
to grant further extensions after one year and eight months.135 The court 
was responding in frustration, rather than applying a rule based upon 
statutory intent, because the government had missed deadlines under 
which it had already agreed to make a decision.136 
B. Mixed Treatment of the Standard During the Next Decade 
In 2000, the District Court for the District of New Mexico permit-
ted several extensions of the seal period in U.S. ex rel. Downy v. Corn-
                                                            
 129. Id. at 1347. 
 130. United States ex rel. O’Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 902 F. Supp. 189, 190 (E.D. 
Mo. 1995). 
 131. United States ex rel. LaCorte v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., No. CIV. A. 
97–0942, 1998 WL 840012, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 121998); United States ex rel. Costa v. Baker & 
Taylor, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 1188, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 
 132. Costa, 955 F. Supp. at 1190. 
 133. Id. at 1191. 
 134. Id. at 1190–92. 
 135. LaCorte, 1998 WL 840012 at *2. 
 136. Id. 
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ing, Inc.137 The government ultimately declined intervention, and the re-
lator continued to pursue the case individually.138 After the case was 
served on the defendants, the defendants moved to have the complaint 
dismissed.139 One of the defendants’ challenges was that the statute of 
limitations was not tolled until the complaint became unsealed.140 In dis-
cussing this argument, the court noted that such an approach would im-
properly “pressure the government to act immediately,” rather than re-
quest the extensions expressly permitted by the FCA.141 Acknowledging 
that this move may be a favorable policy for defendants, the court found 
that the statute and legislative history do not indicate that Congress in-
tended this result.142 The court also recognized that the rationale for seal-
ing an FCA complaint is similar to the rationale for sealing criminal in-
dictments.143 In 2001, multiple courts permitted cases to remain sealed 
for several years as the government investigated violations of the FCA.144 
In 2002, a state court was asked to interpret “good cause” under the 
California version of the FCA, which permitted the State to “dismiss the 
action for good cause notwithstanding the objections of the qui tam 
plaintiff if the qui tam plaintiff has been notified . . . of the motion and 
the court has provided the qui tam plaintiff with an opportunity to oppose 
the motion and present evidence at a hearing.”145 The court began by not-
ing that it is not unusual for a statute not to define the term “good 
cause.”146 Rather, “[i]t usually falls to the courts to establish the bounda-
ries of good cause,” for the “concept is relative and depends on all the 
circumstances.”147 This position reinforces the problems that exist as a 
result of the current statute’s dependence on a finding of the amorphous 
“good cause” standard. 
                                                            
 137. United States ex rel. Downy v. Corning, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1162 (D.N.M. 2000). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1163. 
 140. Id. at 1170–71. 
 141. Id. at 1171. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Grp., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 
1328 n.16 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (seal in place for six years); United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-
Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 43 (D. Mass. 2001) (seal in place for over three years); United States ex 
rel. Goodstein v. McLaren Reg’l Med. Ctr., 97-CV-72992-DT, 2001 WL 34091259, at *1 (E.D. 
Mich. Nov. 12, 2001) (seal in place for three years). 
 145. Laraway v. Sutro & Co., Inc., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 823, 829–30 (2002). The court noted that 
the federal FCA did not include the “good faith” language for dismissing an FCA case over the 
objection of a relator. Id. at 830. Nevertheless, this discussion of the definition of good faith is in-
structive. 
 146. Id. at 829. 
 147. Id. at 830. 
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The California court went on to state that good cause “may be 
based on any matter relevant to the determination.”148 The court conclud-
ed that as a general rule, “‘good cause’ includes reasons that are fair, 
honest, in good faith, not trivial, arbitrary, capricious, or pretextual, and 
reasonably related to legitimate needs, goals, and purposes.”149 This 
analysis illustrates a broad spectrum of possible motives that can meet 
the good cause standard. 
In the following years, several cases were permitted to remain un-
der seal for lengthy periods of time. For instance, in Massachusetts, the 
complaint in United States ex rel. Health Outcomes Technologies v. 
Hallmark Health Systems, Inc. was kept under seal for eight years.150 In 
the Second Circuit, the complaint in United States v. Baylor University 
Medical Center was kept under seal for eight years,151 as a result of six-
teen separate requests.152 The district court granted these motions be-
cause the case involved complex interpretation of Medicare laws that had 
undergone significant changes during the seal period.153 After unsealing 
the case, the defendants argued that the statute of limitations had run be-
cause the government’s intervention did not relate back to the filing by 
the relator.154 After a spate of similar motions to dismiss, the issue of re-
lation back was eventually mooted by the 2009 amendments to the FCA 
because Congress mandated that relation back must occur.155 
                                                            
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. United States ex rel. Health Outcomes Techs. v. Hallmark Health Sys., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 
2d 170, 172 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 151. United States v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 469 F.3d 263, 266 (2d Cir. 2006). The defendant 
did not argue that “good cause” was not satisfied and the court did not address whether eight years 
was too long; rather, the defendant argued that the government’s intervention should not relate back 
to the filing of the relator’s qui tam complaint. Id. at 267. 
 152. Id. at 266. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 267. After the government filed complaints-in-intervention, the defendants moved to 
dismiss the claims based upon the statute of limitations. Id. The district court dismissed claims unre-
lated to the FCA, but determined that the FCA claims were proper because “the controlling date for 
statute-of-limitations purposes was the date of the original qui tam complaint, and all claims had 
accrued within the applicable limitations period of that original complaint.” Id. On appeal, the Se-
cond Circuit reversed the decision of the district court ordering dismissal of the FCA claims. Id. at 
268. The court reasoned that the statute was not yet tolled until the government elected to intervene. 
The court also determined that the complaints-in-intervention did not “relate back” to the relator’s 
prior qui tam complaint, which was filed eight years earlier. Id. at 270. Since the 2009 amendments 
to the FCA, Congress has mandated that relation back must occur. As such, the eight-year seal peri-
od would not interfere with the validity of the government’s claims today. 
 155. See infra Part VI. The FCA’s statute of limitations does not affect the good cause deci-
sion. 
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In 2006, the Northern District of Illinois retained a relator’s com-
plaint for over seven years.156 The court reasoned that “[i]n FCA cases, it 
is appropriate to deny a motion to unseal a court file if unsealing would 
disclose confidential investigative techniques, reveal information that 
would jeopardize an ongoing investigation, or injure non-parties.”157 
Such materials include documents that provide “some substantive details 
regarding the government’s methods of investigation.”158 In the same 
year, the Northern District of California upheld the seal in another FCA 
case for nearly five years.159 
In 2007, the courts continued to grant necessary extensions of the 
seal period. The Western District of Washington granted “repeated” ap-
plications to the court to enlarge the seal period.160 This “lengthy investi-
gation ultimately resulted in [the United States’] decision to intervene 
and in the filing of a joint stipulation of dismissal in settlement of all civ-
il claims.”161 That same year, the Southern District of Ohio allowed a 
case to remain fully under seal for over four years,162 and the Western 
District of Pennsylvania granted each of the government’s five requests 
for extensions (amounting to some ten months) prior to making a deci-
sion to decline.163 That same year, the District of Massachusetts permit-
ted a complaint to remain under seal for over nine years.164 There, the 
                                                            
 156. United States ex rel. Yannacopolous v. Gen. Dynamics, 457 F. Supp. 2d 854, 857 (N.D. 
Ill. 2006). 
 157. Id. at 858. 
 158. Id. See also Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., 397 F.3d 925, 930 (10th Cir. 2005) (seal extend-
ed for two years; the issue on appeal did not address the length of the seal period, but centered 
around the power of the government to dismiss a case after declining to intervene). 
 159. United States ex rel. Lee v. Horizon W., Inc., No. C 00–2921 SBA, 2006 WL 305966, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2006). 
 160. United States ex rel. Erickson v. Univ. of Wash. Physicians, 339 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1125 
(W.D. Wash. 2007). 
 161. Id. 
 162. United States ex rel. Howard v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 1:99-CV-285, 2007 WL 
1513999 (S.D. Ohio May 22, 2007). 
 163. United States ex rel. Singh v. Bradford Reg’l Med. Ctr., Civil No. 04–186 Erie, 2007 WL 
7705584 (W.D. Pa. June 6, 2007). There, the court noted that the seal needed to be extended in order 
for the government to obtain additional information needed to make an intervention decision. Id. at 
*3. Due to the government’s diligent efforts to investigate and the complexity and extent of the 
allegations, the court found that good cause existed for extending the seal. Id. at *4. 
 164. In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 498 F. Supp. 2d 389, 392 (D. Mass. 
2007). Once unsealed, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, claiming it was time barred by the 
statute of limitations. Id. at 393. Relying on United States v. St. Joseph’s Reg’l Health Ctr., 240 F. 
Supp. 2d 882 (W.D. Ark. 2002), and United States v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 469 F.3d 263, 266 (2d 
Cir. 2006), the defendants claimed that the statute was not tolled until the government filed its com-
plaint in intervention, and that the complaint did not relate back to the relator’s qui tam complaint 
filed nine years earlier. In re Pharm. Indus., 498 F. Supp. at 395–99. However, the court dismissed 
this argument, noting that “[t]he unique structure of the FCA supports the government’s position that 
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defendant challenged the sufficiency of the initial complaint, claiming 
that the government’s failure to diligently investigate the claims permit-
ted the removal of the seal.165 While the court recognized that a nine-year 
seal period is not typical, the court also noted that the defendant failed to 
provide evidence that the government acted in bad faith or in a prejudi-
cial manner.166 Instead, the government presented evidence that the de-
fendants were aware of the litigation early on and took efforts to con-
vince the government not to intervene in the case, potentially delaying 
the ultimate decision.167 As such, the court found that the extensions 
were neither improper nor prejudicial.168 
In 2008, one judge in the Northern District of Alabama demonstrat-
ed particular confusion over the confines of the seal period.169 The judge 
ordered that the FCA mandates that the government must make a deci-
sion regarding intervention during the initial sixty-day period.170 The 
judge opined that any extensions granted for good cause apply to the seal 
period only, not to the time to make the decision about intervention.171 
This case has not been followed and has been recognized as a misinter-
pretation of law by FCA experts.172 
Three years later, in 2011, one qui tam case in the District of Mary-
land remained under seal for three and a half years.173 In another case in 
the District of South Carolina, the court granted nineteen extension re-
quests before it said that no more extensions would be granted in the 
case.174 
                                                                                                                                     
the government’s complaint should be treated as an amended complaint that relates back to the rela-
tor’s complaint under Rule 15(c)(1).” Again, the issue of tolling became moot by the 2009 amend-
ments to the FCA. See discussion supra at text accompanying notes 70–78. 
 165. In re Pharm. Indus., 498 F. Supp. 2d at 398–99. 
 166. Id. at 399. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. United States ex rel. Law v. Spurlock, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1352 (N.D. Ala. 2008). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. SYLVIA, supra note 58, at § 11.17. 
 173. United States ex rel. Rostholder v. Omnicare, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 2d 547 (D. Md. 2011). 
 174. United States ex rel. Knight v. Reliant Hospice, Inc., No. 3:08–3724–CMC, 2011 WL 
1321584 (D.S.C. Apr. 4, 2011). In addition, in determining whether to allow the government to 
intervene at a later date following an initial denial of intervention, the Northern District of Alabama 
has considered a variety of factors, including when the government determined that the alleged fraud 
was of great magnitude, whether there was discovery of additional evidence revealed through an 
unrelated investigation, and whether intervention would protect the interest of the relator. See United 
States v. Aseracare, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-0245-KOB, 2012 WL 5308779 (N.D. Ala. 2012). 
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C. A Few Recent Cases Narrowly Addressing Extension Requests 
Unfortunately, some courts have recently disregarded the extension 
provision provided in the FCA, and at least one court has intimated that 
sixty days should be viewed as the maximum time allowed to investigate 
qui tam claims.175 In 2012, a judge in the Eastern District of Tennessee 
issued a ruling putting the government on notice that, going forward, qui 
tam proceedings would be sealed only for “the statutorily mandated six-
ty-day period.”176 The judge acknowledged the statute’s good cause re-
quirement, but stated that previous extensions of the seal period were “an 
error the Court does not intend to repeat.”177 The decision was reached 
despite the fact that all the parties had been in favor of keeping the seal 
in place for the prior four years, and were now in favor of an additional 
extension.178 In fact, the news media was the driving force for lifting the 
seal.179 
After the Tennessee district court rejected any additional exten-
sions, it proceeded to articulate a good cause standard that is inconsistent 
with the standard drafted by the legislature: “The court will expect [the 
government] to delineate a clear rationale for the extension[, which] . . . 
will be met with significant scrutiny—allegations regarding a lack of 
resources or manufactured complexity simply will not suffice.”180 In so 
ruling, the court essentially created a strict scrutiny standard for the good 
cause requirement. This is simply not what Congress intended. 
Equally troubling, and most recently, a judge in the District of 
South Carolina issued a standing order limiting the vast majority of cases 
to the sixty-day seal period.181 The court expressed that it was displeased 
that several of its current qui tam cases were required to be reported on 
the court’s semi-annual report of long-pending cases.182 Thus, the court 
stated that discovery and settlement negotiations are no longer sufficient 
                                                            
 175. See United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625 
(E.D. Tenn. 2012); United States ex rel. LaCorte v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., No. 
CIV. A. 97–0942, 1998 WL 840012 (E.D. La. 1998); United States ex rel. Law v. Spurlock, 582 F. 
Supp. 2d 1350, 1352 (N.D. Ala. 2008). 
 176. Martin, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 625. 
 177. Id. at 626. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Standing Order, In Re All Qui Tam Actions Filed Under the Federal False Claims Act 
Pending on the Docket of United States District Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., 3:13-mc-452-JFA 
(D.S.C. Nov. 18, 2013), available at http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/south-
carolina/scdce/3:2013mc00452/206011/1. 
 182. Id. at 1–2. 
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reasons for extending the seal period of a case.183 The court, however, 
failed to provide any examples of what would constitute good cause for 
extending the seal period.184 While the judge did not say outright that no 
more extensions would be granted, he did express clear disapproval of all 
extension requests recently granted in the district.185 
D. Several Courts Indefinitely Seal Cases During the Government’s  
Investigation 
In sharp contrast, many courts routinely place qui tam cases on ad-
ministrative hold so that these unique cases do not count negatively to-
wards judges as long-pending cases.186 In those jurisdictions, once the 
sealed qui tam case is administratively stayed, the government no longer 
files motions for extensions.187 Most of these courts simply wait until the 
government asks that the case be placed back on the regular docket, 
while other courts ask the government to periodically inform them 
whether the case should still be on hold.188 In these settings, the govern-
ment is automatically granted sufficient time to issue subpoenas or con-
duct discovery, as permitted under the FCA. 
In sum, based upon the varying standards being used by the courts, 
there is a need for a uniform, statutory-based approach for addressing 
whether good cause exists for continuing the seal on qui tam cases while 
the government conducts its investigation and makes a decision to inter-
vene. 
V. THERE SHOULD BE A PRESUMPTION THAT COMPLAINTS SHOULD BE 
KEPT UNDER SEAL FOR AT LEAST THREE YEARS, PROVIDED THAT 
PROGRESS IS BEING MADE, AND SIX YEARS IF MORE TIME IS NEEDED 
DUE TO THE SIZE OR COMPLEXITY OF THE ALLEGATIONS 
The statutory language, purposes, and goals of the FCA demon-
strate that “good cause” was intended to be a flexible standard designed 
to permit the government a full opportunity to complete its investigation 
in a manner without interference by the defendant or other interested par-
ties. This Article argues that the proper standard for applying the good 
cause requirement should be that requests by the government for exten-
                                                            
 183. Id. at 2–3. 
 184. See id. 
 185. Id. at 3. 
 186. See United States ex rel. Mallavarapu v. Acadiana Cardiology, Civil Action No. 04–732, 
2010 WL 3896425, at *16–17 (W.D. La. Aug. 16, 2010). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
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sions of the seal period be liberally granted for up to three years, provid-
ed that its investigation remains active and ongoing, and up to six years if 
the government can show a need for more time due to the size or com-
plexity of the case or other circumstances requiring more time than an 
ordinary fraud investigation. To go beyond six years, however, this Arti-
cle proposes that the government must obtain a partial lifting of the seal 
to notify the defendant of the allegations and obtain consent. 
There is a strong statutory and practical basis for selecting two sep-
arate timelines for extending the seal without notice to the defendant, 
complete with different standards. With respect to the initial three-year 
period, there are two reasons why that time is justified. First, the average 
time it takes the government to intervene in a case is slightly over three 
years.189 According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) re-
port released in 2006, which evaluated the False Claims Act, “[c]ases in 
which DOJ intervened took a median of 38 months to conclude and 
ranged from 4 months to 187 months.”190 As earlier addressed, providing 
the government with the time it actually takes to conduct a fraud investi-
gation is the ultimate goal and purpose of the FCA. Because three years 
reflects the average time necessary to make an intervention decision, re-
quests for extensions within that period should be granted provided the 
government informs the court that its investigation is active and pro-
gressing. 
Second, another portion of the FCA uses a three-year period of time 
that is linked to the timing of the government’s investigation. Specifical-
ly, the FCA contains a unique statute of limitations that reflects an 
acknowledgement that a standard qui tam investigation can take three 
years.191 Under the two-tiered FCA statute of limitations, the government 
has an absolute six years from the date of the submission of a false claim 
to bring an FCA suit. However, the statute of limitations is extended to 
ten years provided that the government finishes its investigation within 
three years of when officials charged with investigating have notice of 
the fraud allegations.192 In other words, if the government files an FCA 
suit within three years from when a government official with authority to 
                                                            
 189. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 81, at 31. 
 190. Id. 
 191. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1)–(2) (2012) (“A civil action under section 3730 may not be brought 
(1) more than 6 years after the date on which the violation of section 3729 is committed, or (2) more 
than 3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should 
have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the cir-
cumstances, but in no event more than 10 years after the date on which the violation is committed, 
whichever occurs last.”). 
 192. Id. 
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act upon fraud learns of the allegations, the statute of limitations is ten 
years. If, however, the government takes longer than three years to act, 
the statute of limitations is six years. Thus, Congress chose to provide the 
government with an “incentive” whereby it rewarded the government 
with a longer statute of limitations if it completes its fraud investigations 
within three years. In doing so, Congress implicitly recognized within the 
FCA itself that three years—and not the initial sixty days—was a good 
benchmark for how long most investigations should take and built a re-
ward system into the FCA for acting within three years.193 At the same 
time, however, Congress wanted to ensure that the government had a 
minimum of six years to complete its investigation. Thus, the FCA has a 
unique dual statute of limitations, which is premised upon the length of 
the government’s investigation. 
With respect to the second three-year period of time proposed by 
this Article, there is equal support within the FCA for allowing the gov-
ernment longer time to investigate more complicated cases. This Article 
advocates for a six-year standard for extensions for two reasons. First, 
six years is the amount of time it may actually take to investigate larger 
or more complicated cases. The GAO found that although the average 
FCA investigation took thirty-eight months, in many cases it was consid-
erably longer.194 In fact, courts have found that extensions of seven or 
eight years can satisfy the good cause standard because of special cir-
cumstances.195 Thus, there remains a strong need for the government to 
continue to investigate larger or more complicated cases beyond three 
years. 
Second, the FCA’s statute of limitations grants the government a 
minimum of six years to investigate all fraud allegations.196 Even though 
Congress sought to incentivize the government to finish its investigations 
within three years by rewarding it with a ten-year statute of limitations, 
Congress chose to retain the six-year minimum should the government 
need longer than three years to complete its investigation. Thus, the stat-
                                                            
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See United States v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 469 F.3d 263, 266 (2d Cir. 2006) (eight 
years); United States ex rel. Yannacopolous v. Gen. Dynamics, 457 F. Supp. 2d 854, 857 (N.D. Ill. 
2006) (over seven years); United States ex rel. Health Outcomes Techs. v. Hallmark Health Sys., 
349 F. Supp. 2d 170, 172 (D. Mass. 2004) (eight years). This Article recognizes that there may be 
rare cases where six years is still not sufficient or where the interests of justice warrant a longer 
period of time. Therefore, this Article proposes that for any extensions beyond six years, the gov-
ernment would need to show extraordinary circumstances. One reason would include if there already 
had been a partial lifting of the seal whereby the defendant had notice of the qui tam suit and it con-
sented to the government’s further request. 
 196. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1)–(2) (2012). 
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utory framework recognizes that although most investigations may take 
up to three years, the government should not be limited to less than six 
years to complete its investigation. Accordingly, this Article adopts a 
two-tiered presumption of good cause, consisting of three- and six-year 
frameworks depending upon how large or complex the case.197 
Because “good cause” is designed to be flexible enough to account 
for varying circumstances and the needs of the government to complete 
its investigation, this Article also proposes a different standard within 
each of the two categories of time. As recognized above, different sizes 
and types of cases naturally take different amounts of time to investigate. 
Accordingly, the standards for good cause should reflect the purpose of 
each time frame. The first three-year time period is designed to capture 
the smaller and less complicated fraud cases, whereas the second three-
year time period is reserved for cases taking longer than normal, typical-
ly due to some special circumstance, such as size or complexity.198 In 
addition, within the second three-year time period, a court should liberal-
ly grant extensions in situations where the government has previously 
obtained a partial lifting of the seal to inform the defendant of the qui 
tam complaint, and the defendant informs the government that it con-
sents to further extensions. By consenting, the defendant voluntarily 
waives any argument that the passage of time hinders its rights. In fact, 
in such situations, a defendant desires that the seal remain in place be-
cause such preservation advances its rights. 
Often, it is advantageous for a defendant to allow the investigation 
to be completed before fraud allegations become public. For instance, it 
provides the parties an opportunity to discuss defenses and settlement 
without outside influences. In fact, when there has not been a qui tam 
complaint filed and the government is facing the expiration of the stand-
ard six-year statute of limitations, a defendant may choose to enter into a 
tolling agreement and waive the statute of limitations, rather than force 
the government to file suit, to preserve its rights.199 Thus, this Article 
argues that the government and defendant should be permitted to reach a 
                                                            
 197. In recent years, there have been over a hundred qui tam cases that settled for over $50 
million, which were complex fraud cases consisting of hundreds of false claims. Top False Claims 
Act Cases by Civil Award Amount, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC. FUND, http://taf.org/general-
resources/top-100-fca-cases (last visited Jan. 2, 2015). It would not be unreasonable to expect that 
cases over $5 million could take more than three years, and the largest cases to take the full six 
years. 
 198. In the following paragraphs, this Article suggests that a case is presumed to be complex if 
the damages are $10 million, and also proceeds to elaborate other indicia of complexity. 
 199. While working for the government, the author has executed several agreements with 
defendants to waive or extend the FCA’s statute of limitations while investigating fraud in non-qui 
tam investigations. 
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consensus that a government investigation be allowed to proceed beyond 
six years. A court should allow the government to have additional exten-
sions of the seal, even beyond six years, if the court partially lifts the seal 
and the defendant consents to extensions of the seal. 
With respect to the initial three-year period, there should be a pre-
sumption that the government is permitted to utilize three full years to 
complete its investigation. Accordingly, courts should liberally grant ex-
tensions within the initial three-year period as long as the investigation is 
still active and ongoing. However, because some investigations are com-
pleted prior to three years, the courts may require the government to ei-
ther notify them when the investigation is complete, or to submit an ap-
plication for an extension every six to twelve months and confirm that 
the investigation is still ongoing and more time is needed. Thus, a court 
has the option of placing a case on administrative hold or ruling on peri-
odic motions. For instance, a court may place a qui tam case on adminis-
trative hold to prevent it from being counted towards timelines or the age 
of the case on the docket.200 In that setting, the court could require the 
government to periodically submit a status report stating that the investi-
gation is still ongoing. If the court chooses to keep a case on the regular 
docket, albeit sealed, the court should liberally grant extensions upon 
verification by the government that the investigation is still active and 
ongoing. 
With respect to requests for time after the initial three-year period 
and up to six years, a proper standard for “good cause” would require at 
least some showing that the particular investigation requires more time 
than ordinary—or, alternatively, that the defendant consents. According-
ly, the courts could require the government to make applications for an 
extension every six to twelve months, and to not only confirm that the 
investigation is still ongoing but to state the reasons why more time is 
needed, such as size, complexity, or other circumstances requiring more 
time than an ordinary case.201 However, courts should still liberally grant 
extensions of time when the government articulates a good faith basis. 
Examples of a proper basis for allowing up to six years include cases 
where the allegations are that the loss to the government is $10 million or 
larger, the number of false claims exceeds 100, the fraud scheme is oc-
curring at multiple locations or on a nationwide basis, or the fraud 
                                                            
 200. “The District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to 
control its own docket.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 
299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). 
 201. The court may still keep the case on administrative hold and require the government to 
submit status reports containing the same type of information. 
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scheme is particularly complex. In addition, the court should liberally 
grant extensions if the defendant is not only aware of the FCA allega-
tions, but consents to the continuation of the seal. 
Given the purpose of the investigatory time period, courts should 
presume that the government is acting in good faith and should not deny 
a motion merely because the court believes that the investigation could 
have been conducted more quickly. In addition, good cause can also in-
clude good faith settlement discussions with the defendant regardless of 
the size of the case. In those circumstances, in all likelihood the case has 
been partially unsealed and the defendant has been provided with at least 
a redacted complaint. Moreover, the defendant is in agreement that the 
case should remain under seal, which clearly would satisfy the definition 
of good cause. Indeed, reaching a settlement prior to unsealing the case 
benefits the defendant, for example by protecting its reputation.202 Thus, 
good cause would be presumptively met in all situations where there al-
ready had been a partial lifting of the seal whereby the defendant had 
notice of the qui tam suit and consented to the government’s further re-
quest. 
Finally, the court may extend the seal beyond six years in rare or 
unusual cases. Examples include cases larger than $100 million, instanc-
es where there will likely be a consolidation of multiple qui tam suits, or 
when the defendant is notified and consents. Again, the purpose of the 
qui tam provisions is to augment and enlarge—not constrict—the gov-
ernment’s investigatory tools and ultimate recoveries of funds lost due to 
fraud. In sum, the government should be allowed at least the same inves-
tigatory powers and length of time that it would be allowed if a qui tam 
suit had not been filed. 
A. Other FCA “Good Cause” Provisions Support the Proposed Standard 
There are two other “good cause” provisions built into the FCA, 
one of which is particularly instructive and supports the standards pro-
posed by this Article.203 The most analogous “good cause” FCA provi-
                                                            
 202. For instance, when the government announces a fraud investigation or FCA suit, the pub-
lic may be concerned about whether the company may be barred from future government contracts, 
thus impacting stock prices and the ability to obtain contracts with other companies. As stated earli-
er, courts have recognized the importance of protecting the reputation of the defendant during the 
time the government is investigating fraud allegations. See supra text accompanying note 63. 
 203. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B) (2012); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2012). This Article does 
not discuss 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B) because no court has addressed this provision, which reads: 
“The Government may settle the action with the defendant notwithstanding the objections of the 
person initiating the action if the court determines, after a hearing, that the proposed settlement is 
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sion provides that if the government declines to intervene in a qui tam 
case and the relator proceeds alone, the government can petition the court 
to allow it to reenter the case at a later date upon a showing of good 
cause.204 Specifically, the FCA reads: 
If the Government elects not to proceed with the action, the person 
who initiated the action shall have the right to conduct the action. If 
the Government so requests, it shall be served with copies of all 
pleadings filed in the action and shall be supplied with copies of all 
deposition transcripts (at the Government’s expense). When a per-
son proceeds with the action, the court, without limiting the status 
and rights of the person initiating the action, may nevertheless per-
mit the Government to intervene at a later date upon a showing of 
good cause.205 
This provision recognizes that, at times, the government may make 
a decision to decline a case after conducting its investigation, but seek 
permission to later intervene. Congress chose the exact same “good 
cause” standard here as it did for making an intervention decision. Be-
cause both good cause provisions relate to government intervention, they 
should be afforded similar treatment. 
A review of the case law pertaining to this subpart of the FCA 
shows that courts have treated this good cause provision very liberally, 
and, in fact, have granted every single motion by the government, per-
mitting the government to intervene in qui tam cases after initially de-
clining to intervene.206 For instance, courts have found good cause when 
the government later “realized that the alleged fraud was of greater mag-
nitude than it originally had believed, and where the Government has 
received additional evidence about a case through a related civil case.”207 
This highlights the need for the courts to adopt a similarly flexible and 
deferential approach when seeking additional time to make the election 
decision. Again, Congress designed the FCA to be the government’s 
primary fraud investigative tool. Courts should give deference and liber-
ally find good cause for not only reentering a qui tam case, but also for 
deciding whether to take the case in the first place. 
                                                                                                                                     
fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances. Upon a showing of good cause, such 
hearing may be held in camera.” (emphasis added). 
 204. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2012). 
 205. Id. (emphasis added). 
 206. Sylvia, supra note 58, at § 11.22. 
 207. Id. 
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B. The Unique FCA Context 
Attempting to look outside of the FCA for a definition or standard 
is not particularly fruitful because there is no standard definition of the 
term “good cause” within American jurisprudence. Rather, good cause is 
highly context specific. It is used in literally hundreds of different set-
tings, each with its own guiding principles, which typically apply only in 
that particular framework.208 
As indicated, context is everything when it comes to good cause. 
The following analogy reinforces the point that the purposes and goals of 
the FCA’s seal period must be taken into account when ruling on good 
cause. Assume that a national organization establishes a running program 
where a marathon is run in every state. Under the rules, competitors are 
told that water stations will be placed every three miles, an ambulance 
will be located at the halfway point, and that the police will block off 
traffic throughout the city. The rules also state that the race will end in 
six hours, regardless of the distance traveled. The rules, however, do not 
specifically state that the race is twenty-six miles long. Based on these 
instructions, races in most states place the finish line twenty-six miles 
away. However, in a few states, a few race officials set the finish line at 
one mile because they think twenty-six miles is too far or might take too 
long. In the context of the rules already in place—with aid stations 
placed every three miles, and a maximum time allotted of six hours—it 
would be unreasonable to assume that the race should be limited to just 
one mile. 
Here, the seal provision must be read in context with other rules 
governing the FCA. First, Congress intended a lengthy statute of limita-
tions for investigating allegations of fraud against the government, and 
even included a unique provision under which it extended the statute of 
limitations from six to ten years as an incentive to complete the investi-
gation within three years.209 Thus, enforcing an absolute sixty-day period 
against a three- or six-year stretch is illogical. 
Second, the context of good cause under the FCA is also measured 
by the CID provisions that authorize the government to take depositions, 
and utilize interrogatories and document requests as part of its investiga-
                                                            
 208. For instance, West’s Encyclopedia of American Law defines “good cause” as follows: 
“Legally adequate or substantial grounds or reason to take a certain action. The term good cause is a 
relative one and is dependent upon the circumstances of each individual case. For example, a party 
in a legal action who wants to do something after a particular Statue of Limitations has expired must 
show good cause, or justification for needing additional time. A serious illness or accident might, for 
example, constitute good cause.” WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 113 (2d ed. 2005) 
(emphasis added). 
 209. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1)–(2) (2012). 
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tion.210 In fact, it is critical in the context of good cause that the FCA 
specifically limits these CID tools during the pendency of the govern-
ment’s investigation. Because it generally takes many months (or even 
years) to employ these devices effectively and conduct a proper investi-
gation of complex allegations of fraud against the government, the seal 
period must be viewed as a marathon, not a sprint. Insisting upon a short 
investigatory time is tantamount to entirely eliminating the CID provi-
sions. Good cause in this context must allow the government to plod 
along its path as long as it does not stop making progress. Thus, it would 
be unreasonable for a judge to determine that the government’s investi-
gation is a sprint that must be completed in sixty days or six months. 
Third, the FCA’s unique qui tam provisions and procedures also 
impact the definition or standard of “good cause.” Specifically, the only 
way for a whistleblower to claim a reward for reporting fraud against the 
government is to file a qui tam suit.211 If the whistleblower chose not to 
claim a reward, there would be no qui tam filed and consequently no ap-
plicable “good faith” clause.212 The statute of limitations would be the 
only constraint upon the government’s investigation. Thus, shortening 
the time for a government investigation merely because a reward applica-
tion has been filed does not warrant holding that the government must 
sprint through its investigation and forego using the CID provisions that 
it could otherwise use if a whistleblower had called a hotline to report the 
fraud. In other words, it is both unjustifiable and patently illogical that 
Congress would affirmatively empower the government to utilize CIDs 
and then fail to provide sufficient time to use them. 
In sum, based on the unique context of the FCA, this Article pro-
poses a good cause standard that is consistent with the goals, purposes, 
and actual language of the FCA. Given this context, good cause means 
extending the FCA’s seal period until the conclusion of the government’s 
investigation. Accordingly, requests by the government for extensions of 
the seal period should be liberally granted for up to three years, provided 
that the investigation remains active and ongoing; up to six years, pro-
vided that the government can show a need for more time due to the size 
or complexity of the case or other circumstances requiring more time 
than an ordinary fraud investigation; and beyond six years with the con-
sent of the defendant. 
                                                            
 210. 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (2012). See also supra Part III.A. 
 211. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 212. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3) (2012) (“The Government may, for good cause shown, move the 
court for extensions of the time during which the complaint remains under seal under paragraph (2). 
Any such motions may be supported by affidavits or other submissions in camera.”). 
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This standard ensures that the government has sufficient time to ful-
ly investigate the alleged fraud and make a decision regarding interven-
tion based upon the merits of the case and utilization of the CID devices 
available only during the seal period rather than upon a judge’s prefer-
ence for how long an investigation should take. Having fraud allegations 
determined on the merits also promotes and protects vital interests of 
both the government and the accused. Congress clearly intended the FCA 
to be a strong tool for the people, and with a seal period of up to six years 
dependent upon making progress and longer with consent of the defend-
ant, it can be. 
VI. THE FCA’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT AFFECT THE GOOD 
CAUSE DECISION 
One objection raised by a commentator arguing for brevity of the 
seal period is that a lengthy extension would violate or improperly 
lengthen the statute of limitations.213 This argument had much greater 
weight prior to 2009 when Congress amended the FCA’s statute of limi-
tations. In response to several court rulings that had the effect of limiting 
the seal period due to the FCA’s statute of limitations, Congress amend-
ed the statute of limitations to provide that the government’s intervention 
would relate back to the date of filing of the relator’s qui tam complaint, 
even if it would effectively lengthen the FCA’s six or ten year statute of 
limitation.214 The FCA now reads: 
(c) If the Government elects to intervene and proceed with an action 
brought under 3730(b), the Government may file its own complaint 
or amend the complaint of a person who has brought an action un-
der section 3730(b) to clarify or add detail to the claims in which 
the Government is intervening and to add any additional claims 
with respect to which the Government contends it is entitled to re-
lief. For statute of limitations purposes, any such Government 
pleading shall relate back to the filing date of the complaint of the 
person who originally brought the action, to the extent that the 
claim of the Government arises out of the conduct, transactions, or 
occurrences set forth, or attempted to be set forth, in the prior com-
plaint of that person.215 
                                                            
 213. Laura Hough, Finding Equilibrium: Exploring Due Process Violations in the Whistle-
blower Provisions of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 1061, 1062, 1073–78, 1089 (2011). 
 214. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c) (2012); see also sources cited infra note 217. 
 215. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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As elaborated below, Congress has the unfettered right to lengthen 
or even eliminate a statute of limitations for bringing a fraud action, as 
well as the right to grant the government lengthy sealing of the qui tam 
complaint to allow it to fully investigate the allegations. Here, Congress 
has unequivocally expressed that the statute of limitations should not be 
a barrier to granting lengthy extensions of the seal on qui tam cases. 
Consider the following: Assume that a company submitted a false 
claim on July 1, 2000, and that the relator filed a qui tam five years later, 
on July 1, 2005. The government moved for—and was granted—several 
extensions of time, each with the relator’s consent, consisting of four 
years. On July 1, 2009, the government filed a notice that it was interven-
ing and the case was unsealed. 
Under the pre-2009 version of the FCA, absent a court applying an 
equitable-based relation back analysis (such as Rule 15 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure), the statute of limitations would have run on 
the government because it intervened nine years after the date of the false 
claim, which is longer than the FCA’s general six-year statute of limita-
tions, and the ten-year limitation period would not apply because the 
government did not act within three years of learning of the fraud. Thus, 
absent relation back, the statute of limitations would appear to expire 
against the government, although not for the relator. 
Prior to amending the FCA in 2009, most courts conducted either a 
due process analysis or relied upon Rule 15(c)(1)(C),216 which required 
notice to the defendant and lack of prejudice.217 Either way, some form 
of balancing was required to determine whether it would be fair to relate 
the government’s filing back to the date of the relator’s complaint. The 
problem with failing to apply relation back was obvious: it meant that the 
relator could proceed because his complaint was timely, but the govern-
ment was foreclosed from participating. Because the government is the 
real party in interest in FCA suits, it would be illogical not to allow it to 
participate. Thus, some courts simply allowed relation back, while others 
strictly followed the relation back analysis, resulting in a circuit split as 
to whether relation back applied.218 
Congress settled the split by amending the FCA in 2009 to specify 
that the government’s intervention always relates back to the date of the 
relator’s initial qui tam complaint.219 Thus, in our scenario, even though 
the case is unsealed nine years after the false claim was submitted, it 
                                                            
 216. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C). 
 217. SYLVIA, supra note 58, at § 10.67. See also id. at § 11.105. 
 218. Id. at § 11.105. 
 219. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c) (2012). See also SYLVIA, supra note 58, at § 10.67. 
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clearly satisfies the 2009 version of the FCA’s statute of limitations. In 
other words, Congress mooted this issue by expressly amending and ef-
fectively lengthening the FCA’s statute of limitations for government 
intervention by mandating that relation back must occur. 
Although recognizing that Congress had authority to lengthen the 
statute of limitations, one commentator nevertheless continues to errone-
ously suggest that a due process balancing approach remains necessary 
for retaining the seal period in the event that it extends beyond the statute 
of limitations contained in the pre-2009 version of the FCA.220 However, 
courts are not permitted to balance interests when applying a statute of 
limitations contained in a federal statute against the government.221 
There are several reasons why the statute of limitations should not 
be a factor for determining good cause extensions of time to intervene. 
First, if the relator filed timely, the statute of limitations is indisputably 
tolled. Allowing the government additional time to investigate merely 
provides it with what Congress intended—time to make a fully informed 
decision after conducting informal discovery through the use of subpoe-
nas. 
Second, Congress acted appropriately by tolling the statute of limi-
tations and relating the government’s intervention back to the filing of a 
qui tam complaint. Indeed, Congress could have gone further, such as by 
setting the statute of limitations at fifteen years rather than the current 
six- or ten-year tiered system. It could even have totally eliminated the 
statute of limitations, which Congress did with respect to filing false or 
fraudulent tax returns.222 Absent Congress dictating a statute of limita-
tions upon itself, there is no statute of limitations against the government. 
“The general rule regarding statutes of limitation and the government is 
that ‘the government is not subject to any time constraints in bringing its 
actions.’ This rule stems from the legal maxim quod nullum tempus 
occurrit regi, which literally means ‘no time runs against the King.’”223 
Stated another way: 
                                                            
 220. Hough, supra note 213, at 1062, 1073–78, 1089. 
 221. See infra note 227. 
 222. There is no statute of limitations for tax fraud; the IRS may bring an action to assess taxes 
anytime a taxpayer submits a “false or fraudulent” return, “willful[ly] attempt[s] . . . to defeat or 
evade tax,” or fails to submit a tax return. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(c)(1)–(3) (2010). See also Badaracco v. 
Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 406 n.7 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “the limitations 
period will never run [when the transferor committed fraud]”); Payne v. Comm’r, 224 F.3d 415, 420 
(5th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that § 6501(c) exempts false or fraudulent returns from any statute of 
limitations). 
 223. Douglas Edward Pittman, Is Time Up for Equitable Relief? Examining Whether the Stat-
ute of Limitations Contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 Applies to Claims for Injunctive Relief, 70 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 2449, 2461–62 (2013) (internal citations omitted). 
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When considering whether a statute of limitations defense is viable 
against the government for your particular facts, it is important to 
remember that the general rule is that the government, when acting 
in its sovereign capacity, is not subject to any time limitations for 
bringing a claim, absent a Congressional enactment to the contra-
ry.224 
It wasn’t until the 1960s that “Congress narrowed the application of this 
rule by enacting general statutory limitation provisions that apply to gov-
ernment actions.”225 In short, Congress can choose any length of time it 
desires and may have different statutes of limitations under different 
statutory schemes. 
Third, there is no room for balancing interests when determining 
the scope or construction of a federal statute of limitations as applied 
against the government. As the Supreme Court has noted: “It is well set-
tled that the United States is not bound by state statutes of limitation or 
subject to the defense of laches in enforcing its rights.”226 Moreover, 
“[the] Court long ago pronounced the [following] standard: ‘Statutes of 
limitation sought to be applied to bar rights of the Government must re-
ceive a strict construction in favor of the Government.’”227 As one schol-
ar has observed, “[t]his rule encourages courts to interpret statutes of lim-
itations in a manner which favors inapplicability to a claim brought by 
the government.”228 She continues: 
The statutory nature of the defense mandates a different analysis 
than the analysis required for asserting common law defenses 
against the government. In these cases the court does not engage in 
a balancing of competing interests because, in enacting the statute, 
Congress has already struck such a balance. Rather, application of a 
particular statute of limitation usually depends upon the court’s in-
terpretation of the express provisions of the statute.229 
In sum, the statute of limitations set by Congress in the FCA is con-
trolling and should be given full effect. Courts should avoid the tempta-
tion to effectively reduce the FCA’s statute of limitations by limiting the 
amount of time the government has to conduct its investigation during 
                                                            
 224. Mary V. Laitos et al., Equitable Defenses Against the Government in the Natural Re-
sources and Environmental Law Context, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 273, 302 (2000). 
 225. Id. 
 226. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940) (citations omitted). 
 227. Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 391 (1984) (citations omitted). See also Laitos, 
supra note 224, at 303 (observing that “all statute of limitations will be strictly construed in favor of 
the government”). 
 228. Laitos, supra note 224, at 303–04. 
 229. Id. at 302. 
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the seal period. Congress clearly wants the government to be permitted 
time to fully investigate the relator’s fraud allegations because it is the 
real party in interest. This privilege includes the time needed to issue 
subpoenas or take depositions utilizing the FCA’s CID powers. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
False claims against the government have been and continue to be 
an epidemic. To combat this fraud, Congress amended the False Claims 
Act several times to improve its reach, such as by adding qui tam provi-
sions that pay rewards to whistleblowers for stepping forward, and by 
strengthening CID investigatory tools that give the government power to 
issue subpoenas for documents and testimony prior to intervening in a 
qui tam suit. In addition, to ensure that the government has sufficient 
time to investigate allegations of fraud, the FCA contains a six-year min-
imum statute of limitations, plus an incentive of an additional four years 
(up to ten years) if the government completes its investigation within 
three years. Unfortunately, some courts have artificially restricted the 
CID provisions and statute of limitations with respect to qui tam cases. 
Even though the FCA keeps a qui tam case under seal for sixty 
days, it permits the government to request additional extensions upon a 
showing of good cause. Due to the lack of a uniform interpretation of 
“good cause,” courts vary widely in the amount of time given to the gov-
ernment to investigate fraud claims raised in a qui tam suit, ranging from 
sixty days to longer than nine years. Unfortunately, some courts have 
restricted the investigative time so severely as to effectively eliminate the 
CID investigatory provisions in the FCA (which are only available dur-
ing the seal period) and artificially shorten the statute of limitations. 
Even though the average length of an FCA fraud investigation exceeds 
three years, some courts are limiting the seal period in qui tam cases to a 
mere handful of months. 
Although good cause is not defined, it is clear from the overall 
structure and goals of the FCA that the government should be permitted 
at least the same amount of time that it would be allowed to investigate 
had a qui tam complaint not been filed, and to otherwise utilize the CID 
tools and statute of limitations. Indeed, Congress recently amended both 
the CID and statute of limitations provisions to effectively eliminate re-
strictive time requirements. In short, the government’s intervention deci-
sion should be made on the merits rather than pursuant to artificial time 
constraints imposed by courts. Accordingly, for the reasons advanced in 
this Article, and to allow the FCA to have the full weight intended by 
Congress, requests by the government for extensions of the qui tam seal 
period should be liberally granted for up to three years, provided that the 
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investigation remains active and ongoing; up to six years provided that 
the government can show a need for more time due to the size or com-
plexity of the case or other circumstances requiring more time than an 
ordinary fraud investigation; and even longer with consent of the defend-
ant. 
